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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper we demonstrate that legislation has a simple, yet previously undetected 
impact on firm stock prices.  While it is understood that the government and firms have 
an important relationship, it remains difficult to determine which firms any given piece of 
legislation will affect, and how it will affect them.  By observing the actions of legislators 
whose constituents are the affected firms, we can gather insights into the likely impact of 
government legislation on firms.  Specifically, focusing attention on “interested” 
legislators’ behavior captures important information seemingly ignored by the market.  A 
long-short portfolio based on these legislators’ views earns abnormal returns of over 90 
basis points per month following the passage of legislation.  Further, the more complex 
the legislation, the more difficulty the market has in assessing the impact of these bills.  
Consistent with the legislator incentive mechanism, the more concentrated the legislator’s 
interest in the industry, the more informative are her votes for future returns. 
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An important but understudied relationship that impacts firms is the one between 
firms and the government.  Specifically, governments pass laws that affect firms’ 
competitive environment, products, labor force, and capital, both directly and indirectly.  
While this relationship is well-understood, it is often difficult to determine which firms 
any given piece of legislation will affect, and how it will affect them.  However, we do 
observe the behavior of agents with a direct interest in the firms affected by legislation.  
By observing the actions of legislators whose constituents are the affected firms (its 
employees, suppliers, other local stakeholders, etc.), we can gather insights into the likely 
impact of government legislation on firms.  Specifically, focusing attention on the 
legislators who have the largest vested interests in firms affected by a given piece of 
legislation gives a powerful lens into the impact of that legislation on the firms in 
question; a lens that the market does not appear to be gazing through. 
It turns out that very rich data exists on the behavior of legislators.  Legislator 
voting behavior is public and detailed going back decades for both chambers of the U.S. 
Congress (the Senate and House of Representatives).  Further, this data gives a fair 
amount of power in that each firm (by definition) is headquartered in at least one 
legislator’s constituency, but for each firm and industry being affected by a given bill 
there will be a large group of "un-interested" legislators to compare against.  There are 
enough "un-interested" legislators that are alike in nearly every other dimension (party-
affiliation, ideology, voting on all other bills, etc.) that we can form very fine control 
groups to tease out solely the part of legislators’ voting behaviors that is driven by their 
direct interest in a given firm or industry.       
If the market does not fully incorporate the information in legislator behavior to 
infer each bill’s full effect on firms, then that leaves rich, important information for firms’ 
underlying values that is unincorporated into market prices.  The advantage of this 
approach is that we can use the actions of legislators to predictably identify the 
subsequent impact of each law on each firm. 
An important issue will of course be how much of a bill’s impact on firm values is 
already incorporated by the market into firms’ prices.  To answer this question, we show 
that there is almost no run-up in terms of firm returns in the 6- (or 12-) month period  
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prior to the bill’s passage.  Additionally, and interestingly, there are zero abnormal 
returns in the month that the bill is actually passed.  Only over the post-passage period 
does the market sluggishly begin to realize the impact of the bill for firm values.   
The measurement of which firms are materially impacted by a given bill is at the 
crux of this paper.  As mentioned above, we measure this by using the simple but 
powerful method of listening closely to only those legislators who have a vested interest in 
the given bill.  We identify interests by the amount of economic activity in that 
legislator’s state that is likely affected by the bill in question.  Specifically, we look at 
number of firms, number of employees, and aggregate size of firms, for each industry in 
each state, and assign each legislator’s interests based on these measures.  We focus on 
industries rather than firms as only very rarely can a legislator put language into a bill 
that solely affects an individual firm (empirically, we only see this a handful of times in 
our 20 year sample of all legislation).  This may be for cosmetic reasons, or simply 
because a legislator often has many firms from a given industry in her state, and so does 
not want to appear to favor one, at the perceived detriment to others.  This also may be 
impacted by (or be the driver behind) most powerful lobbying groups (which we measure 
and discuss later in the paper) forming at the industry level.    
Given that our classification scheme of bills (described in Section II) assigns 
affected industries to bills based on the text of the bill regarding each industry, we can 
then see how these “interested” legislators vote versus uninterested legislators on each 
respective bill.  Given that these interested and uninterested legislator groups change for 
each bill depending solely on industry, this forms finely specified treatment and control 
groups that allow us to control for other voting determinants, and identify solely this 
vested interest impact on each vote. 
We then simply see whether interested legislators are more positive or more 
negative for the bill (relative to the uninterested control group).  If the interested 
legislators vote more in favor of a bill covering their vested industries than uninterested 
legislators, we code this as a positive bill for the underlying industry.  If they vote more 
negatively for a bill that passes
1 than uninterested legislators, we code this as a negative 
                                                 
1 We limit to bills that pass as these are the bills that have the potential to actively change the regulatory  
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bill for the industry. 
Using this simple method, we show that a long-short portfolio of industry returns 
in the month following the passage of a bill where we listen solely to vested interest 
legislators (i.e., long the affected industries when interested senators are especially 
positive about the bills passing, and short the affected industries when interested senators 
are especially negative about the bills passing), yields returns of 76 basis points per 
month.  These returns are virtually unaffected by controls for known risk determinants.  
For example, the four-factor alpha of this long-short portfolio yields abnormal returns of 
92 basis points (t=3.01) per month, or over 11 percent per year. 
As mentioned above, we see no run-up in returns before the bill passage, and no 
abnormal return in the announcement month.  Further, the large abnormal returns that 
we document in month t+1 continue to accrue for a number of future months, suggesting 
that this interested legislator behavior does contain important information for underlying 
firm values.  Collectively, these results are consistent with the market having difficulty in 
deciphering the information contained in bills for future firm value.  More strikingly, the 
market does not seem to be taking into account the seemingly simple information in the 
vested interest legislators voting on these exact bills following bill passage, when it is 
completely in the public domain. 
One alternative explanation is that any simple manner in which you code these 
bills may lead to abnormal returns if the market is truly ignoring the legislation.  There 
may be nothing special, then, about isolating those legislators with the largest vested 
interests, per se.  To get a feel for this, we look at two other logical methods to see their 
ability to pick up this same information for firm values.  If you believe that legislators on 
average bring positive bills to passage to help their constituent industries, then a simple 
strategy of longing the industries when bills about them pass, and shorting industries 
when bills about them fail, would yield abnormal returns.  A second, more nuanced 
method, uses the text of the bill itself along with established dictionaries of positive and 
negative words, to classify each bill as positive or negative for an industry.  We construct 
                                                                                                                                                                
environment for the treated firms.  We understand that bills that fail also likely contain information for 
firms even if they keep the status-quo regulatory regime (if the market probabilistically weights the 
likelihood of passage), and we show evidence on these, as well.   
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both of these measures, and find that neither the more naïve strategy nor the textual 
analysis strategy have any predictive ability over firm returns.
2  Thus, it appears to be 
something unique about exploiting the incentives and vested interests of legislators that 
gives an especially informative measure of the impact of bills on firm values. 
We also conduct a number of tests designed to isolate the mechanism driving our 
main results.  For example, if we truly are identifying important information in interested 
legislators’ behaviors for future firm values, then if we could find even more concentrated 
interests, these accompanying legislators should have even more informative behavior.   
We approach this idea in several ways.  The first is to measure concentrated interests by 
looking at legislators whose largest state industry (e.g., oil) also makes up a large fraction 
of their total state’s economic activity.  We find, consistent with more concentrated 
interests being even more informative, that the long-short portfolio following these 
especially concentrated vested legislators yields four-factor abnormal returns of 105 basis 
points per month (t=2.37). 
The second way we link these returns more directly to the interests of legislators is 
by looking at how important the given bill is for each industry mentioned in the bill.  
Although a number of industries may be mentioned in a given bill, a bill may largely 
focus on a single industry and only peripherally touch on a number of others.  If legislator 
interest really is the driving force behind our return results, we should see the most 
informative votes being those most directly impacted by the bill; thus, the industry that 
dominates the bill’s text.  When we focus on the voting of solely the interested legislators 
who are impacted by the most dominant industry in the bill, the long-short portfolio 
returns rise to 130 basis points per month (t=2.78), or 15.6% per year.  To focus even 
further on these most important mentioned industries, we also look solely at those firms 
in the most important mentioned industry who are headquartered in interested 
legislators’ states.  The idea here is that legislators, while not able to mention specific 
firms, still can have some latitude to focus industry-wide legislation in a way that most 
benefits the firms in their states (e.g., loosening offshore drilling regulations, while 
keeping oil fracking regulations constant).  While this reduces the sample size quite a bit, 
                                                 
2 It is important to note that we again see no pre-vote run up, nor any announcement effects, using either 
of these two measures to classify positive legislation and negative legislation for firms.  
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the effect on the magnitude is large: the long-short portfolio has returns of 184 basis 
points per month (t=1.89). 
To explore the question of what allows the return predictability we document to 
persist, we also examine the complexity of the bills in question.  Specifically, we test the 
idea that the market may have a harder time deciphering the likely impact of a 
complicated bill as opposed to a simpler bill, and hence we should observe more return 
predictability following the passage of complex bills.  Using the number of times a bill is 
voted on as a measure of bill complexity, we show that the spread portfolio on complex 
bills earns large positive abnormal returns (ranging from 85 basis points in raw returns 
(t=2.19) to 90 basis points (t=2.28) in four-factor alphas), while the set of non-complex 
bills is associated with much smaller (and insignificant) return predictability, consistent 
with the idea that the market has more difficulty processing the likely impact of 
complicated pieces of legislation as opposed to more routine bills.  
We also examine the impact of lobbying on our results.  The motivation behind 
this test is that when see industry lobbying organizations spending large amounts of 
money, it presumably is to sway the opinion of legislators.  If this works, and if lobbyists 
spend even part of this money outside of states that already have a vested interest in the 
law (which is not unreasonable, given that constituent interest may be a substitute for 
this, and so the marginal lobbying may be better spent on a legislator who does not 
already have a vested interest), then we would expect formerly “uninterested” legislators 
to be treated by lobbyists, so in a sense to now become somewhat “interested.”  This 
reduces the distance between our “interested” and “uninterested” legislator measure (as 
some of the previously uninterested legislators are now interested), and so reduces the 
power and predictability of the measure.  We find exactly this to be true: when industry 
lobby groups have large amounts of spending in a given year, the predictability of our 
measure of interested versus uninterested legislators by simply location of economic 
activity drops by almost half.    
As a final robustness check, we show that the effect we document has actually 
gotten stronger over time:  in the more recent period, the magnitudes of the return effects 
are 15-20% larger.  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the setting 
and related literature. Section II describes the data. Section III presents the main 
portfolio and regression results. Section IV explores the mechanism in more detail. 
Section V presents additional examining lobbying expenditures and our main results. 
Section VI concludes. 
 
I. Related Literature 
Our paper adds to a vast literature that studies the impact of government policies 
on firms.  While a large literature studies the impact of government actions (e.g., 
spending policies) on broader state-level outcomes (see, for example Clemens and Miran 
(2010), Chodorow-Reich, et al. (2010), Wilson (2011), Fishback and Kachanovskaya 
(2010), Serrato and Wingender (2011) and Shoag (2011)), our approach in this paper is 
closest to a recent strand of the literature that explores firm-level outcomes.  These 
papers examine the benefits that firms perceive (and receive) from currying favor and/or 
making connections with politicians, such as higher valuations (Roberts (1990), Fisman 
(2001), Jayachandran (2006), Faccio (2006), Faccio and Parsley (2006), Fisman et. al 
(2007), Goldman et. al (2007)), corporate bailouts and government intervention (Faccio 
et. al (2006), Duchin and Sosyura (2009), Tahoun and Van Lent (2010)), and lucrative 
procurement contracts (Goldman et. al (2008)).
3  Our focus in this paper is on all 
Congressional legislation, not simply budget bills or spending polices, and our outcome 
variable of interest is the stock returns of affected firms.  In this sense, our paper is also 
related to a recent literature examining the impact of government policy on asset prices 
(Pastor and Veronesi (2012), Belo, Gala, and Li (2012)).  Our approach in this paper is 
unique in that we focus on politician-level voting behavior and bill-level legislation in 
order to identify the impact of legislation on firms. 
Finally, since our empirical strategy relies on the idea that firm-level constituent 
interests affect Congressional voting, our paper is also related to a large literature 
studying the factors that influence the behavior of elected officials.  Much of this 
                                                 
3 See also Cohen, Coval, and Malloy (2011) for evidence on the impact of state-level earmark spending on 
firm-level outcomes such as investment and employment, and Julio and Yook (2012) who document that 
corporate investment varies with the timing of national elections around the world.  
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literature (see, for example, Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1985)) argues that political 
party and constituent interests are key determinants of politicians’ voting behavior.   
Hibbing and Marsh (1991), Stratmann (2000), Pande (2003), Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
(2004), and Washington (2007) also provide evidence that personal characteristics such as 
service length, age, religion, race, gender, and the presence of a daughter in one’s family 
can affect the behavior of elected officials.  Finally, a variety of papers stress the 
importance of political ideology in explaining Congressional voting behavior (see Clinton, 
Jackman, and Rivers (2004), Kau and Rubin (1979, 1993), Lee, Moretti, and Butler 
(2004), McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (1997), McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006), and 
Poole and Rosenthal (1985), (1997), (2007)).  Meanwhile, Levitt (1996), Ansolabehere et. 
al (2001), Synder and Groseclose (2000), Kalt and Zupan (1990), and Mian et. al (2009) 
provide a number of different perspectives on separating out the impact of ideology 
versus party interests, constituent interests, and special interests.  Since our interested 
and uninterested legislator groups change for each bill depending solely on industry, this 
forms finely specified treatment and control groups that allow us to control for other 
voting determinants, and identify solely this vested interest impact on each vote. 
 
II. Data and Summary Statistics 
  We combine a variety of novel data sources to create the sample we use in this 
paper.  Our primary source of data is the complete legislative record of all Senators and 
all Representatives on all bills from the 101st through 110th Congresses.  We collect this 
from the Library of Congress’ Thomas database.  Each "Congress" is two years long, and 
is broken into two one-year-long "Sessions."  Therefore, 10 Congresses represents twenty 
years of Congressional data from 1989-2008.  We collect the result of each roll call vote 
for the twenty-year period in each chamber of the Congress, and record the individual 
votes for every Congressman voting on the bill (or abstaining).  We choose to start with 
the raw bill data, rather than use alternate, publicly available versions of the 
Congressional roll call data (see, for example, the Voteview website, as well as McCarty, 
Poole and Rosenthal (1997), McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006), Poole and Rosenthal 
(1985), (1997), (2007), among many others), or the Political Institutions and Public 
Choice (PIPC) House Roll Call Database (Aldrich, Brady, de Marchi, McDonald, Nyhan,  
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Rohde, and Tofias (2008)), because we exploit the text of each piece of legislation as 
described below. 
A key aspect of our empirical strategy is that we utilize the content of the bills 
being voted on.  To do so, we download the full text of all bills being voted on over our 
sample.  We collect the full-text data jointly from the websites of the Government 
Printing Office (GPO), and from the Thomas database.  As in Cohen and Malloy (2011), 
we then parse and analyze the full bill text to classify each bill into its main purpose.  
For our tests, we attempt to assign each bill to one (or more) of the 49 industry 
classifications used in Fama and French (1997).
4  To do this we first construct a set of 
keywords for each industry.  We then create an executable (shown in Figure A1), in 
which we input all bills and their corresponding full-text and assign bills to industries 
based on the count of the number of times these keywords appear in a given bill.  We 
only assign a bill to an industry if the number of instances of a particular keyword 
exceeds a certain threshold of frequency on a given bill relative to its overall frequency in 
the entire population of bills.
5  Individual bills can be assigned to more than one industry; 
however, we use a conservative assignment procedure such that our procedure only 
results in industry assignments of any kind for less than 20% of all bills, and specifically 
only those bills where we can confidently gauge that an industry is likely to be affected 
by the bill in question.  Figure A1 presents an example of a particular bill that was 
assigned only to the Fama-French industry #30: Petroleum and Natural Gas, based on 
the relative frequency of pre-specified keywords in the bill that pertain to this industry.  
Figure A1 displays the summary text at the top of the bill, which indicates that the bill 
clearly pertains to the oil and gas industry.  The data Appendix provides more details on 
our bill assignment procedure.  We have compared our bill categorizations to those used 
in other work (see, for example, Aldrich, Brady, de Marchi, McDonald, Nyhan, Rohde, 
and Tofias (2008), among others), but prefer our approach because it achieves our 
explicit goal of assigning each bill to the specific industries (and thus firms) that are 
potentially affected, rather than to the specific policy issues under consideration. 
                                                 
4 The “Fama-French 49” industry definitions map specific 4-digit SIC (standard industry classification) 
codes to 49 different industry categories, and are publicly available online from: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/. 
5 We have experimented with various thresholds, and our results are not sensitive to the particular 
threshold we employ.  Please see the Appendix for more details on our bill classification procedure.  
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  Importantly, our empirical approach in this paper also requires us to “sign” the 
impact of each bill, as positive or negative, for the given industry it affects.  We do so by 
exploiting the voting record of those Senators who are likely to identify it as a relevant 
industry to their constituents.  To identify the constituent interests of a given Senator, 
we assign each firm domiciled in a Senator’s home state to one of the Fama-French 49 
industries; “relevant” industries to a particular Senator on a particular bill are those 
industries that: i.) are assigned to that bill using the procedure described above, and ii.) 
have at least one firm headquartered in the Senator’s home state that belongs to the 
given industry.  We then rank all the industries in each Senator’s state by aggregating all 
firms in each industry by size (sales and market cap), and define “important” industries 
as those that rank in the top three for each state in terms of size.  Next we sign each bill 
by looking at the voting records of those Senators who have “important” industries that 
are mentioned in the bill; we term these Senators as “interested” Senators, and term all 
the remaining Senators as “uninterested” Senators.  The rationale behind this procedure 
is that a Senator’s vote on a particular bill that affects important firms in his state is 
likely to suggest how that bill will affect those firms in his state; thus we can infer that a 
yes vote by a Senator with a vested interest in a bill is likely to mean that the bill is 
positive for the industry he cares about, and vice versa for a no vote.   
  Figure A2 displays the executable program we created to implement our signing 
procedure for the same bill depicted in Figure A1. The summary text indicates that the 
goal of this bill is "to provide energy price relief and hold oil companies and other entities 
accountable for their actions with regard to high energy prices, and for other purposes," 
so the bill is likely to be perceived as negative for the oil and gas industry.  And not 
surprisingly, even though this vote lined up largely along party lines, none of the 6 
Republican Senators who voted in favor of the bill were Senators who were "tied" to this 
industry via constituent interests in their home state (all 8 industry-tied Republicans 
voted against), and 1 of the 2 Democrats who voted against the bill was Mary Landrieu 
of Louisiana, a state heavily represented by oil and gas interests (the other Democrat who 
voted against was Henry Reid from Nevada, a consistent supporter of oil and gas 
companies); the 6 industry-tied Democrats who voted in favor of the bill did so largely on 
party and ideological grounds (variables that we control for in our tests, as described  
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below).   
Specifically, we “sign” each bill’s expected impact on a given industry by 
comparing the votes of “interested” Senators on that bill to the votes of “uninterested” 
Senators on that bill.  Again, interested Senators on a given bill are those where an 
industry affected by the bill is a “Top 3” industry in that Senator’s home state (where 
industries are ranked within each state by total aggregate firm sales, or total market 
capitalization).  We then compute an Economic Interest signing measure as follows: we 
compute the ratio of positive votes of all interested Senators by dividing their total 
number of yes votes on a bill by their total number of votes, and compare this to the 
ratio of positive votes of all uninterested Senators; if the ratio of positive votes by 
interested Senators is greater than that for uninterested Senators, we call this a 
“positive” bill for the industry in question, and if the ratio of positive votes for interested 
Senators is less than that for uninterested Senators, we call this a “negative” bill for the 
industry.  Our results are very similar regardless of whether we use this ratio difference 
(“R-R” in Figure A2) measure, or alternative signing measures such as the absolute ratio 
("Ratio" in Figure A2, i.e., the percentage of industry-tied Senators who vote for the 
bill), or the relative ratio ("R/R" in Figure A2, i.e., the percentage of industry-tied 
Senators who vote for the bill divided by the percentage of all Senators who vote for the 
bill). and the ratio difference ("R-R" in Figure A2, i.e., the percentage of industry-tied 
Senators who vote for the bill minus the percentage of all Senators who vote for the bill); 
our results are not sensitive to the particular signing measure we employ.  We have also 
tried within-party signing measures that are computed identically to those above, except 
aggregated within each party (since many votes are along party lines) and again the 
results are very similar.  The data Appendix contains more details on our signing 
procedure.
6 
For some of our ancillary tests, we also hand-collect lobbying data from the 
OpenSecrets.org website (sponsored by the Center for Responsible Politics).  Finally, we 
draw monthly firm-level stock returns, shares outstanding, and volume capitalization 
from CRSP, and extract firm-specific accounting variables, such sales, research and 
                                                 
6 The data Appendix provides more details about the industry assignment keywords, procedure, cut-offs, 
etc.    
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development (R&D) expenditures, capital expenditures (CAPEX), and book equity, from 
Compustat. 
Table I presents summary statistics from our sample.  As Table I shows, over 82 
percent of bills in our sample pass.  As a result, for a given bill, an average of 73 votes 
are “Yea” votes.  For our Top 3 classification of “interested” Senators, the average 
number of Yea votes is around 8.  Finally, the mean industry-level value-weight return 
over our sample period (199001-200812) is 78 basis points per month.   
 
III. Results 
A. Portfolio Returns on Naïve Classifications 
Our primary tests examine the impact of legislation on the stock returns of 
industries affected by a given bill.  Since our bill assignment procedure is at the industry-
level (rather than at the firm-level, since individual firms are rarely mentioned in bills), 
we compute the value-weighted returns to all 49 Fama-French industries, and use these 
value-weight industry returns as our outcome variables.   
We begin by examining the returns to a naïve strategy for signing the direction of 
impact of legislation on the underlying affected industries.  Specifically, in Panel A of 
Table II we perform a calendar-time portfolio approach as follows: for each final Senate 
vote on a bill, we examine the stock returns of affected firms following the passage or 
failure of the bill.  We form a “Long” portfolio that buys the firms in each industry that 
we assign to a bill (weighted by market capitalization) when the bill passes, and a 
“Short” portfolio that sells the firms in each industry that we assign to a bill (weighted 
by market capitalization) when the bill fails. Affected stocks do not enter the portfolio 
until the month following the passage of a bill, and portfolios are rebalanced monthly.  
Panel A reports the average monthly “Long-Short” portfolio return for a portfolio that 
goes buys the “Long” portfolio and sells the “Short” portfolio each month.  The “CAPM 
alpha” is a risk-adjusted return equal to the intercept from a time-series regression of the 
Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on the value-weight market index (see Fama 
and French (1996)). The “Fama-French alpha” is a risk-adjusted return equal to the 
intercept from a time-series regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on 
the value-weight market index, the return on the size (SMB) factor, and the return on  
Legislating Stock Prices — Page 14 
 
the value (HML) factor (see Fama and French (1996)).  The “Carhart alpha” is a risk-
adjusted return equal to the intercept from a time-series regression of the Long-Short 
portfolio on the excess return on the value-weight market index, the return on the size 
(SMB) factor, the return on the value (HML) factor, and the return on a prior-year 
return momentum (MOM) factor (see Carhart (1997)).   
As Panel A shows, the returns to this naïve strategy for signing bills are 
essentially zero.  Also, there does not appear to be any price run-up in the period prior to 
and including the month of passage/failure of a bill, as the long-short portfolio return in 
the pre-vote period (using returns from months t-6 to t, where month t is the month of 
passage/failure) is also negligible.  This suggests that on average there is no new 
information in whether a bill passes or fails regarding how these bills will impact the 
underlying firms. 
Our next set of tests uses a slightly more nuanced approach for determining the 
impact of legislation on firms.  Specifically, in Panels B and C, we focus on the set of bills 
that ultimately passed, and attempt to “sign” each bill using different forms of textual 
analysis.  In Panel B, we form a “Long” portfolio that buys the firms in each industry 
that we assign to a bill (weighted by market capitalization) when the bill contains a 
below-median number of negative words (defined using the Harvard psychosocial 
dictionary (see Tetlock (2007)), and a “Short” portfolio that sells the firms in each 
industry that we assign to a bill (weighted by market capitalization) when the bill 
contains an above-median number of negative words.  Panel C conducts the identical 
tests as in Panel B, except that negative words are defined using alternative definition 
categories (see Loughran and McDonald (2011)). 
Panels B and C show that in both the post-passage period (month t+1) and in the 
pre-vote period (months t-6 to t, where month t is again the month of passage), there is 
no impact on the returns of the underlying affected industries.  Thus, trying to infer the 
impact of legislation on firms by using textual analysis that seeks to measure the 
“negativity” of a bill is unhelpful in trying to sign a bill’s likely impact.  This is perhaps 
not surprising given the way bills are typically written, in that they are legal documents 
that are less likely to easily convey sentiment.  Thus the findings in Table II help to 
motivate our approach, since simple methods for inferring the likely impact of legislation  
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on firms reveal no systematic impact in terms of returns, both in the period leading up to 
a bill’s passage, and in the period immediately after a bill’s passage. 
 
B.  Economic Interest Portfolio Returns 
Table III presents our key result.  Rather than using a naïve signing approach, or 
a signing approach based on textual analysis, we simply use the votes of “interested” 
Senators as a vehicle for determining the likely impact of a piece of legislation. 
Specifically, as noted above, we “sign” each bill’s expected impact on a given industry by 
comparing the votes of “interested” Senators on that bill to the votes of “uninterested” 
Senators on that bill.  Recall that interested Senators on a given bill are those where an 
industry affected by the bill is a “Top 3” industry in that Senator’s home state (where 
industries are ranked within each state by total aggregate firm sales).  We then compute 
an Economic Interest signing measure as follows: we compute the ratio of positive votes 
of all interested Senators by dividing their total number of yes votes on a bill by their 
total number of votes, and compare this to the ratio of positive votes of all uninterested 
Senators; if the ratio of positive votes by interested Senators is greater than that for 
uninterested Senators, we call this a “positive” bill for the industry in question, and if the 
ratio of positive votes for interested Senators is less than that for uninterested Senators, 
we call this a “negative” bill for the industry.  We then form a “Long” portfolio that 
buys the firms in each industry that we assign to a bill (weighted by market 
capitalization) where the Economic Interest signing measure is positive, and a “Short” 
portfolio that sells the firms in each industry that we assign to a bill (weighted by market 
capitalization) where the Economic Interest signing measure is negative.  In Panel A of 
Table III, affected stocks do not enter the portfolio until the month following the passage 
of a bill, and portfolios are rebalanced monthly. 
Panel A of Table III shows that the Long/Short portfolio based on this strategy 
earns large abnormal returns.  Using excess returns, CAPM alphas, 3-factor alphas, or 4-
factor alphas, the Long/Short portfolio consistently earns large abnormal returns, ranging 
from 76 basis points per month (t=2.44) to 92 basis points per month (t=3.01).  Most of 
this spread comes on the short side, with the abnormal returns to the short portfolio 
ranging from 71 to 83 basis points per month (t=2.40 and t=2.80, respectively),  
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suggesting that focusing on cases when interested Senators are disproportionately 
negative with respect to a bill that ultimately passes is particularly profitable.  This 
result suggests that simply by focusing on the votes of interested Senators, one can 
determine the subsequent impact of legislation after its passage, and that the market does 
not recognize this impact.
7   
Panels B and C of Table III then examine the returns to these industry portfolios 
in the months leading up to and including the month of passage.  Again there is little 
evidence of run-up in the pre-period, and also virtually no effect in the month of passage, 
suggesting that the market’s response to the information in legislation is indeed delayed.          
 
C.  Announcement Effects and Event-Time Returns 
Table III examined the six months leading up to the bill, the month of passage, 
and the month following the passage of the bill.  From Table III, there did not appear to 
be any significant run-up in pre-passage returns (i.e., probabilistic revelation of passage of 
the bill).  In Figure 1, we examine more closely the days leading up to (and following) the 
passage of the bill, and extend the window to six months following bill passage.  Figure 1 
shows the event-time Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) to the spread (Long-Short) 
portfolio returns (equivalent to Column 3 of the panels in Table III). CARs are computed 
for each side of the portfolio individually using market-adjusted returns, with the figure 
showing the returns to the spread portfolio of these CARs. 
First, from Figure 1 there seems to be little run-up in the days leading up to the 
passage of the bill, as the average CAR from day -10 to 0 is only 4 basis points.   
Importantly, following passage of the bill, the returns then significantly drift upward for 
the next three months (60 days), then flatten, and remain flat thereafter.   
Note that uncertainty leading up to the vote could impact this return pattern in 
Figure 1.  Thus, close votes may see less of a return run-up, but then have an amplified 
initial return (passage-day return), as the uncertainty is resolved.  However, the median 
bill in our sample from Table III and Figure 1 passes with a wide margin: 85 yea 
votes.  Even the 25
th percentile has 69 yea votes, suggesting we simply do not have that 
                                                 
7 We have also computed this Economic Interest signing measure within party (i.e., comparing an 
interested Senator’s vote only to the other uninterested Senator’s within her party).  The raw spread is 
actually slightly larger using this measure, 88 basis points per month (t=3.26).  
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many bills that had much uncertainty of passage leading up to the vote.  Even with these 
non-close votes, we are finding that the average bill (which is not a close vote) appears to 
have very little pre-passage run-up in return, and has returns that drift upward for a long 
period of time following passage.  Thus, the delayed updating to information shown in 
Figure 1 appears to have little to do with the closeness of the vote, or the immediate 
updating of a previously uncertain vote outcome.  Instead, it is more consistent with the 
market not fully understanding and taking into account the economic interests of the 
legislators involved, their impact on voting behavior, and the resulting impact of 
legislation on firms. 
 
D. Short Side Returns 
One of the interesting aspects of Panel A of Table III is that most of the return 
predictability seems to be coming through the short side of the portfolio.  That is to say, 
the bills where interested senators seem to be especially negative relatively to 
uninterested senators seem to result in the large, significantly negatively future returns 
that comprise most of the long-short portfolio return.  A trading-cost friction (i.e., short-
sale constraint) argument for the pattern seems a bit less plausible here than in many 
studies, as we are trading using simple value-weighted industry returns.
8  We thus do a 
number of things to examine these returns in more depth.       
First, we simply examine all months of signals for the long and short portfolios.  
The results in Table III report only those calendar months where both a long and short 
signal exist.  There can be months where solely a bill on which interested senators were 
more positive passed (a long), or solely a bill on which interested senators were more 
negative passed (a short).  When looking at all months, we do begin to see modest 
predictability on the positive side.  When using all of the months (161 and 175 for the 
long and short sides, respectively), as opposed to the 155 where both exist, the Carhart 
four-factor alpha is 34 basis points a month (t=1.76) on the long side, relative to the 14 
basis points from Table III.  The short side alpha is 75 basis points (t=2.76), nearly 
identical to that in Table III.  
                                                 
8 We value-weight across industry returns by total industry market capitalization in the portfolio 
construction, which (although it does not necessarily need to be the case) ends up empirically placing an 
even larger weight on larger capitalization stocks.   
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To further explore this, though, we next examine the relative “positivity” or 
“negativity” of interested senators on the bills in question.  For Table III, we code bills as 
good or bad for the industry (long or short) based simply if interested senators are more 
positive or more negative than the rest of the senate.  It turns out that senators are much 
more negative on bad bills than they are positive on good bills, which may explain why 
the negative bills predict much lower future returns for the associated industries.  For 
instance, on bills negative for the industry interested senators are on average 19.37% 
more negative, while being only 12.00% more positive on good bills.  The difference of 
7.37 percentage points is highly significant (p<0.01).  The difference exists throughout 
the distribution with the 75
th percentile of negativity being 27.35% (versus 17.02% for 
positivity), and the 95
th percentile being 61.96% more negative (but only 34.83% more 
positive).  The difference in relative voting behavior on good versus bad bills for 
industries suggests that a continuous measure of the difference in voting behavior 
between interested and uninterested senators, as opposed to the discrete relative measure 
from Table III, may better capture the impact of voting differences.  This is precisely 
what we implement in Section D below (Table IV).  
 
E.  Cross-Sectional Regressions 
Next we employ monthly Fama and Macbeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions 
each month of industry-level returns on industry-level characteristics, to further assess 
the predictive power of our economic interest signing approach.  Unlike with individual 
stock returns, however, which exhibit well-known size (Banz (1981)), book-to-market 
((Rosenburg. Reid, and Lanstein (1985), Fama and French (1992)), and momentum 
(Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Carhart (1997)) effects, there is much less evidence of 
return predictability in industry returns.  There does appear to be industry momentum 
(see Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999)), and as such we control for industry-level 
momentum (i.e., the industry return from months t-12 to t-2) in our regression tests.  We 
also include controls on the right-hand size for one-month past industry returns, and 
measures of industry-level average size, book-to-market, investment (CAPEX), and 
assets.      
Table IV presents the results of these monthly cross-sectional predictive  
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regressions.  The dependent variable is the value-weighted future industry return (in 
month t+1).  The variable of interest in these regressions is Interested Vote, which is the 
difference between the percentage of interested senators voting in favor of the passed bill 
and uninterested senators voting in favor of the bill.  So, Interested Vote is positive when 
interested senators are more in favor of the bill, and negative when interested senators 
are more negative on the bill.  
Column 1 of Table IV shows that interested senators’ votes have significant 
predictive ability for future industry returns, with the coefficient on Interested Vote being 
0.025 (t=3.03).  This indicates that the more positive interested senators are relative to 
uninterested senators on the given bill, the higher the future returns are for affected 
industries of the bill, consistent with the results in Table III.  Controlling for industry 
momentum, as well as industry-level measures of size, book-to-market, investment, and 
assets, has little effect on this result.  In the full specification in Column 5, Interested 
Vote has a coefficient of 0.037 (t=2.30).  This implies that a one standard deviation 
higher Interested Vote (interested senators voting roughly 10% more in favor of the bill 
than uninterested senators) implies a 37 basis point higher return for the industries 
impacted by the bill. These findings reinforce the results from Table III with a continuous 
measure, also demonstrating that our economic interest signing approach is not simply 
picking up industry-level characteristics. 
Lastly, up to this point we have focused on those bills which pass, as these are the 
bills that have the potential to actively change the regulatory environment for the treated 
firms.  We understand that bills that fail could also contain information for firms even if 
they keep the status-quo regulatory regime (if the market probabilistically weights the 
likelihood of passage).  However, as evidence against this probabilistic price revelation, 
both Table III and Figure 1 indicate that there is no run-up in returns in the months (or 
days) leading up to the passage of these bills.  Nonetheless, we explicitly examine failed 
bills using our economic interest signing, as well.  First, there are only 20 percent as 
many failed bills as there are bills that pass, likely reflecting the fact that bills expected 
to fail are simply not brought up for vote.  For these failed bills, we replicate the exact 
specifications of Table IV, with our economic interest signing now measured as interested 
senators’ negative voting relative to how negative non-interested senators vote on the  
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same bill (so the predicted sign on Interested Vote is again positive).  In the analog to 
the full specification of Column 5 in Table IV, the coefficient on Interested Vote is 0.023 
(t=0.79).  Thus, we find that while the direction of the coefficient is as predicted, the 
magnitude is about two-thirds the size of that of votes passed, and not statistically 
significant, as we might expect given the continuity of regulatory regime. 
  
IV. Tests of the Mechanism: Concentrated Interests, Industry Relevance, 
and Bill Complexity 
  
In this section we explore a variety of ancillary tests in order to help pin down the 
mechanism behind our main result.   
 
A.  Concentrated Interests 
We start by refining our economic interest signing measure even further.  The idea 
behind our first test is that the voting behavior of a particular subset of interested 
Senators may be even more informative than the voting behavior of the entire group of 
interested Senators.  In particular, focusing on the Senators that have “concentrated” 
interests in a particular industry may be especially informative. 
In Table V we perform the same calendar-time portfolio tests as in Table III, 
except that we employ a slightly different signing measure.  Rather than looking at all 
interested Senators, in Panel A we focus only on the voting behavior of Senator’s whose 
largest industry (by market capitalization)
9 represents an above-median level of 
concentration in that state relative to all other states that have that industry during that 
time period. Concentration is measured as the share of a state’s total market cap that is 
made up of the industry in question.  The idea is that these Senators will have an even 
greater vested interest in the fortunes of this particular industry as compared to the other 
significant industries in their states; hence their voting signals on the bills that affect 
these particular industries may be quite informative.  Table V shows that this hypothesis 
is confirmed in the data.  The value-weight industry returns that accrue to the 
                                                 
9 All of the results in this section are identical if sales are used in place of market capitalization.  
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Long/Short portfolio using this refined signing measure are again large and significant, 
ranging from 67 to 97 basis points per month.  Further, in Panel B when we replace the 
“above-median” relative level of concentration with an 80% relative level of concentration 
(as shown in Panel B), this result is even stronger: the Long/Short portfolio earns 
between 84 (t=1.99) and 105 (t=2.27) basis points in this specification.  This result 
suggests that focusing on the Senator’s with the largest vested interests does improve the 
signal about the likely impact of the bill in question.     
 
B.  Industry Relevance and Home State Firms Only 
In Table VI we exploit variation in our industry assignment procedure.   
Specifically, we exploit the idea that some bills may pertain mainly to a particular 
industry, even though a few industries may be coded as “affected” by a given bill.  So 
while our industry assignment procedure (as described above, and in the Appendix) is 
quite conservative in ensuring that only affected industries are coded as such, there is still 
variation in the extent to which one industry may be affected by a bill relative to another 
industry.  In Table VI we exploit this variation in two ways.  First, in Panel A we focus 
solely on cases where the industry in question is the “most” affected of all industries in a 
given bill; in these cases we only use these industries to compute our industry-level value-
weighted return.  Panel A shows that exploiting this variation again strengthens the main 
result, yielding a Long/Short portfolio return ranging from 92 to 130 basis points per 
month.  In Panel B we refine this measure even further by only including the returns of 
those firms in a given industry who happen to be also located in one of the “interested” 
Senators home states.  Panel B shows that this refinement strengthens the result even 
further: the Long/Short portfolio return in this specification ranges from 174 to 201 basis 
points per month.   
 
C.  Complex Bills   
To further explore the mechanism driving our findings, we also explore the 
complexity of the bills in question.  Specifically, we test the idea that the market may 
have a harder time deciphering the likely impact of a complicated bill as opposed to a 
simpler bill, and hence we should observe more return predictability following the passage  
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of complex bills.
10  One issue with identifying the complexity of bills is that it does not 
have a one-to-one mapping with the length of the bill.  This is because many routine 
annual bills (e.g., routine appropriations bills) are among the longest bills.  Thus, in order 
to identify complex bills so as to minimize this problem, we simply compute the number 
of times a given bill was voted on, with the idea that more complicated bills tend to get 
voted on more often.  It turns out that while this measure is positively correlated (0.28) 
with the number of words in each bill, it captures rich variation unrelated to simple bill 
length. 
In Table VII, we exploit this variation in bill complexity and re-run our baseline 
portfolio tests from Table III.  In Panel A, we focus solely on the set of complex bills, 
where complex is defined as a bill that was voted on more times than the median bill (the 
median number of votes on a bill is 2).  Panel A shows that the economic interest spread 
portfolio earns large positive abnormal returns, ranging from 85 basis points in raw 
returns (t=2.19) to 90 basis points (t=2.28) in four-factor alphas.  Meanwhile, Panel B 
shows that the set of non-complex bills (the complement of the sample used in Panel A) 
is associated with much smaller (and insignificant) return predictability, consistent with 
the idea that the market has more difficulty processing the likely impact of complicated 
pieces of legislation as opposed to more routine bills.  
 
 D.  Robustness: Sub-periods and Economic Interest Thresholds 
  In Table VIII we explore a series of additional tests that help to establish the 
robustness of our main result, and help to verify some obvious implications of our 
findings.  We start by splitting our sample in half, and examining the findings over these 
two sub-periods (199001-199912, and 200001-200812).  Panel A of Table VIII shows that 
our main result is large in magnitude in both sub-periods, but is somewhat stronger in 
the more recent sub-period.   
In Panel B of Table VIII we test an implication of our empirical strategy, namely 
that as we broaden our measure of “interested” Senators, our approach should work less 
well.  For example, if we focus on the votes of Senators where any of her Top 5 (or Top 
                                                 
10 See Cohen and Lou (2012) for evidence of substantial return predictability from a set of easy-to-analyze 
(standalone) firms to their more complicated (conglomerate) peers.  
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10) industries in her state (as opposed to Top 3) industries are affected by a given bill, 
we would expect this signal to be somewhat less informative, since these “extra,” smaller 
industries may be less important to the Senator in question.  Panel B shows again that 
this implication is confirmed in the data, as focusing on the votes of Senators using a Top 
5 filter yields a smaller but still significant effect (ranging from 56 to 62 basis points per 
month), and using a Top 10 filter yields an insignificant effect.      
  Overall, the tests in Table V-VIII help to establish the robustness of the main 
result in this paper, by showing that logical alterations of our basic economic interest 
signing approach yield results in the expected directions; when we broaden our signing 
approach, the results are weaker, and when we refine our approach, the results are 
stronger.        
 
V. Other Influences: Lobbying  
  In this final section, we explore an additional potential influence on the voting 
behavior of Senators, in addition to the firm-level economic interest approach that we 
have utilized throughout this paper.  Specifically, we employ data on lobbying 
expenditures.  
  Table IX presents the results of tests seeking to explore the impact of this “other 
influence” on the strength of our economic interest signal.  The lobbying data we use 
(obtained from OpenSecrets.org) unfortunately is not available at the level of a given 
piece of legislation, but is instead available only by industry and by year, and only since 
1999.  In Panel A of Table IX we first replicate our main result (from Table III) over the 
sample period for which lobbying data is available (199901-200812), and verify that our 
findings are large and significant over this sub-period as well.   
We then examine the subset of affected industries for which lobbying is most 
pronounced in a given year (above the 80
th percentile of industries in terms of lobbying 
dollar expenditures).
11  Ou r  h yp o t h e s is  i s  t h a t  t h e  r e s u lt s  s h o u l d  b e  w e a ke r  f o r  t h e s e  
industries, since we do not know to whom these lobbying dollars are flowing.  Thus our 
set of interested Senators may no longer be the full set of “interested” Senators; one 
would want to include all the Senators that received lobbying dollars from a given 
                                                 
11 Using an above-median threshold yields similar results.  
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industry as now potentially treated, or “interested” in the given industry.  In fact, one 
would expect lobbying dollars to be more likely to go to the other Senators (our 
“uninterested” Senators), since lobbyists would not need to waste money lobbying the 
interested Senators who already are going to vote to protect the industry in question.  
This reduces the distance between our “interested” and “uninterested” legislator measure 
(as some of the previously uninterested legislators are now interested), and so reduces the 
power and predictability of the measure.   Panel B of Table IX shows that this conjecture 
is indeed confirmed in the data: the Long/Short portfolio return ranges from 44 to 65 
basis points per month and is no longer significant when we focus solely on the affected 
industries for whom lobbying is most pronounced.   
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we demonstrate that legislation has a simple, yet previously 
undetected impact on firm prices.  Specifically, legislators who have a direct interest in 
firms often vote quite differently than other, uninterested legislators on legislation that 
impacts the firms in question.  Taking a simple approach of listening more closely to the 
more incented legislators yields a portfolio that has large outperformance.  Longing the 
industries following the passage of related bills that interested legislators are especially 
positive about relative to uninterested legislators (and shorting industries in the 
contrasting case), yields abnormal returns of over 90 basis points per month.  These 
returns show no run-up prior to bill passage and no announcement effect directly at bill 
passage.  Further, the returns continue to accrue past the month following passage.   
Collectively, these findings suggest that we are truly capturing information from these 
interested legislators important for firm value; information the market does not seem to 
be realizing. 
We go on to provide more evidence on the proposed mechanism of interested 
legislators.  For instance, these abnormal returns are larger when we focus solely on the 
industries that make up an especially large part of the economic activity in a legislator’s 
state.  Further, the returns are also higher when we restrict to solely the most important 
industries (i.e., the industries that are likely to be most impacted), and the returns are 
larger still when we focus within this industry on those firms located solely in interested  
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legislators’ states.  In addition, the return predictability we document is large and 
significant for complicated bills, but much less so for routine bills, consistent with the 
idea that the market has a much harder time deciphering the likely impact of 
complicated pieces of legislation relative to more mundane bills.  Lastly, when industry 
lobbying groups spend large amounts of capital, likely lobbying legislators outside of the 
states where the industry is already important, this dampens the predictive impact of 
“interested” legislators, as would be expected given that now what we classify as 
geographically uninterested legislators will have been treated by the lobbying firms to 
become “interested.”  Finally, the effect we document in the paper has, if anything, been 
becoming stronger over time. 
In sum, government’s impacts on firms are incontrovertible.  In this paper, we 
formalize an important channel of this relationship, and test whether this relationship 
and its impact is fully understood and incorporated by financial markets.  We believe 
there is a broader implication of our work regarding the critical importance of firms’ 
relationships with their legal and political environment, and the actors who form this 
environment.  
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Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) to Economic Interest Spread Portfolio 
 
This figure shows the event-time Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) to portfolios that invest in 
industries surrounding legislation passage using the economic interests of senators, specifically the voting 
of interested senators (as defined in Table III), to define the legislation’s impact as positive (long) or 
negative (short) on the given industry. CARs are computed for each side of the portfolio individually 
using market-adjusted returns. This figure then presents the returns to the spread portfolio of industry 
CARs (long-short) from 10 days before passage to 6 months following passage of the bill (120 days).  
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Table I: Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics for the sample.  The sample period for the main tests is 199001-200812.  We 
“sign” each bill’s expected impact on a given industry by comparing the votes of “interested” Senators on that bill to 
the votes of “uninterested” Senators on that bill.  Interested Senators on a given bill are those where an industry 
affected by the bill is a “Top 3” industry in that Senator’s home state (where industries are ranked within each state 
by total aggregate firm sales).  We then compute an Economic Interest Signing measure as follows: we compute the 
ratio of positive votes of all interested Senators by dividing their total number of yes votes on a bill by their total 
number of votes, and compare this to the ratio of positive votes of all uninterested Senators; if the ratio of positive 
votes by interested Senators is greater than that for uninterested Senators, we call this a “positive” bill for the 
industry in question, and if the ratio of positive votes for interested Senators is less than that for uninterested 
Senators, we call this a “negative” bill for the industry. 
 
 
 
 Years  1990-2008 
 Mean StdDev Observations 
Number of Firms in Industry  144.8 153.7 6021 
Industry Market Capitalization ($ Millions) 288.1 361.0 6021 
Industry Value-Weight Monthly Return 0.775 6.33 6021 
Pass (=1)  0.821 0.383 6021 
Vote_Yeas  73.65 18.47 6021 
Vote_Nays  22.49 0.399 6021 
Bill_Sign_Top3Sales  0.012 0.198 6021 
Vote_Yeas_Interested_Top3Sales 7.7 10.1 6021 
Vote_Nays_Interested_Top3Sales 2.4 4.6 6021 
Vote_Yeas_NotInterested_Top3Sales 65.9 19.7 6021 
Vote_Nays_NotInterested_Top3Sales 20.1 17.0 6021 
Bill_Sign_Top5Sales  0.003 0.178 6021 
Vote_Yeas_Interested_Top5Sales 12.0 14.2 6021 
Vote_Nays_Interested_Top5Sales 3.8 6.6 6021 
Vote_Yeas_NotInterested_Top5Sales 61.6 21.2 6021 
Vote_Nays_NotInterested_Top5Sales 18.6 16.3 6021 
Bill_Sign_Top10Sales  0.002 0.160 6021 
Vote_Yeas_Interested_Top10Sales 20.4 19.9 6021 
Vote_Nays_Interested_Top10Sales 6.5 9.6 6021 
Vote_Yeas_NotInterested_Top10Sales 53.3 24.0 6021 
Vote_Nays_NotInterested_Top10Sales 16.0 15.2 6021 
    
     
 
Table II: Calendar-Time Industry Portfolio Returns: 
Naïve Bill Signing Approaches 
 
This table examines the stock returns of industries that are classified as affected by a given piece of legislation.  In Panel 
A we perform a calendar-time portfolio approach as follows: for each final Senate vote on a bill, we examine the stock 
returns of affected firms following the passage or failure of the bill.  We form a “Long” portfolio that buys the firms in 
each industry that we assign to a bill (weighted by market capitalization) where the bill passes, and a “Short” portfolio 
that sells the firms in each industry that we assign to a bill (weighted by market capitalization) where the bill fails. 
Affected stocks do not enter the portfolio until the month following the passage of a bill, and portfolios are rebalanced 
monthly. This table reports the average monthly “Long-Short” portfolio return for a portfolio that goes buys the “Long” 
portfolio and sells the “Short” portfolio each month.  The “CAPM alpha” is a risk-adjusted return equal to the intercept 
from a time-series regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on the value-weight market index (see Fama 
and French (1996)). The “Fama-French alpha” is a risk-adjusted return equal to the intercept from a time-series 
regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on the value-weight market index, the return on the size 
(SMB) factor, and the return on the value (HML) factor (see Fama and French (1996)).  The “Carhart alpha” is a risk-
adjusted return equal to the intercept from a time-series regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on the 
value-weight market index, the return on the size (SMB) factor, the return on the value (HML) factor, and the return on 
a prior-year return momentum (MOM) factor (see Carhart (1997)).  In Panels B and C, we focus on the set of bills that 
ultimately passed, and attempt to “sign” each bill using different forms of textual analysis.  In Panel B, we form a “Long” 
portfolio that buys the firms in each industry that we assign to a bill (weighted by market capitalization) when the bill 
contains a below-median number of negative words (defined using the Harvard psychosocial dictionary (see Tetlock 
(2007)), and a “Short” portfolio that sells the firms in each industry that we assign to a bill (weighted by market 
capitalization) when the bill contains an above-median number of negative words.  Panel C conducts the identical tests as 
in Panel B, except that negative words are defined using alternative definition categories (see Loughran and McDonald 
(2011)).  t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and 1%, and 5% statistical significance are indicated with **, and *, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Industry Returns Around Passage of Legislation, Naïve Signing Approach 
   Future  Returns Pre-Returns
 
 Long  (Pass)
Month t+1 
Portfolio 
Return 
Short (Fail)
Month t+1 
Portfolio  
Return 
(Long-Short) 
Month t+1 
Portfolio Return
(Long-Short) 
Month t-6:t 
Portfolio Return 
Average returns   0.49  0.57 -0.09 0.02 
Standard deviation   4.36  4.46 0.33 1.53 
CAPM alpha    0.02  0.12 -0.10 0.05 
   (0.12)  (0.42)  (0.36)  (0.49) 
Fama-French alpha    -0.02 0.05 -0.07 0.03 
   (0.11)  (0.16)  (0.24)  (0.26) 
Carhart alpha    -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.03 
   (0.25)  (0.08)  (0.09)  (0.31)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Industry Returns Around Passage of Legislation, Textual Analysis (Harvard 
Dictionary) Signing Approach 
 Future  Returns   Pre-Returns
 
Long 
(Pass+Harvard 
Pos) 
Month t+1 
Portfolio Return 
Short 
(Pass+Harvard 
Neg) 
Month t+1 
Portfolio  
Return 
(Long-
Short) 
Month t+1 
Portfolio 
Return 
 
(Long-
Short) 
Month t-6:t 
Portfolio 
Return 
Average returns  0.21  0.30 -0.09   -0.09 
Standard deviation  4.87  5.01 2.85   1.29 
CAPM alpha  -0.23  -0.14 -0.09   -0.10 
   (1.07)  (0.56)  (0.33)    (1.09) 
Fama-French alpha  -0.25  -0.15 -0.10   -0.09 
   (1.17)  (0.64)  (0.34)    (0.95) 
Carhart alpha  -0.14  -0.28 0.14   -0.07 
   (0.66)  (1.16)  (0.49)    (0.81) 
Panel C: Industry Returns Around Passage of Legislation, Textual Analysis (Alternate 
Dictionary) Signing Approach 
   Future  Returns   Pre-Returns
 
 
Long 
(Pass+Alternate 
Pos) 
Month t+1 
Portfolio Return 
Short 
(Pass+Alternate 
Neg) 
Month t+1 
Portfolio  
Return 
(Long-Short) 
Month t+1 
Portfolio 
Return 
 
(Long-Short) 
Month t-6:t 
Portfolio 
Return 
Average returns   0.45  0.52 -0.07   0.02
Standard deviation   4.91  5.06 3.25   1.55
CAPM alpha    -0.12 -0.04  -0.08    0.02 
   (0.58)  (0.14)  (0.27)    (0.23) 
Fama-French alpha    -0.15 -0.20  0.05    0.07 
   (0.75)  (0.77)  (0.15)    (0.62) 
Carhart alpha    -0.04 -0.22  0.18    0.07 
   (0.18)  (0.79)  (0.55)    (0.62)  
 
Table III: Calendar-Time Industry Portfolio Returns: 
Economic Interest Signing 
 
This table examines the stock returns of industries that are classified as affected by a given piece of legislation, after that 
given piece of legislation passes, for the subset of bills that are passed by the Senate.  We perform a calendar-time 
portfolio approach as follows: for each final Senate vote on a bill that ultimately passes, we examine the stock returns of 
affected firms following the passage of the bill.  We “sign” each bill’s expected impact on a given industry by comparing 
the votes of “interested” Senators on that bill to the votes of “uninterested” Senators on that bill.  Interested Senators on 
a given bill are those where an industry affected by the bill is a “Top 3” industry in that Senator’s home state (where 
industries are ranked within each state by total aggregate firm sales).  We then compute an Economic Interest Signing 
measure as follows: we compute the ratio of positive votes of all interested Senators by dividing their total number of yes 
votes on a bill by their total number of votes, and compare this to the ratio of positive votes of all uninterested Senators; 
if the ratio of positive votes by interested Senators is greater than that for uninterested Senators, we call this a “positive” 
bill for the industry in question, and if the ratio of positive votes for interested Senators is less than that for uninterested 
Senators, we call this a “negative” bill for the industry.  We then form a “Long” portfolio that buys the firms in each 
industry that we assign to a bill (weighted by market capitalization) where the Economic Interest Signing measure is 
positive, and a “Short” portfolio that sells the firms in each industry that we assign to a bill (weighted by market 
capitalization) where the Economic Interest Signing measure is negative.  In Panel A, affected stocks do not enter the 
portfolio until the month following the passage of a bill, and portfolios are rebalanced monthly. In Panel B, affected stocks 
enter the portfolio in the month of the passage of a bill, and portfolios are rebalanced monthly.  In Panel C, affected 
stocks enter the portfolio 6 months prior to the passage of a bill, and stay in the portfolio until the month prior to the 
passage of the bill. This table reports the average monthly “Long-Short” portfolio return for a portfolio that goes buys the 
“Long” portfolio and sells the “Short” portfolio each month.  The “CAPM alpha” is a risk-adjusted return equal to the 
intercept from a time-series regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on the value-weight market index 
(see Fama and French (1996).  The “Fama-French alpha” is a risk-adjusted return equal to the intercept from a time-
series regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on the value-weight market index, the return on the size 
(SMB) factor, and the return on the value (HML) factor (see Fama and French (1996)).  The “Carhart alpha” is a risk-
adjusted return equal to the intercept from a time-series regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on the 
value-weight market index, the return on the size (SMB) factor, the return on the value (HML) factor, and the return on 
a prior-year return momentum (MOM) factor (see Carhart (1997)). t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and 1%, 5%, and 
10% statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Industry Returns Around Passage of Legislation, Economic Interest Signing 
   Future  Returns
 
 
Long 
(Pass+RelSenPos) 
Month t+1 
Portfolio Return 
Short 
(Pass+RelSenNeg) 
Month t+1 
Portfolio  
Return 
(Long-Short) 
Month t+1 Portfolio 
Return 
Average returns   0.63 -0.14 0.76 
Standard deviation   4.63 5.40 3.84 
CAPM alpha    0.05 -0.71
**  0.76
** 
   (0.28)  (2.40)  (2.44) 
Fama-French alpha    0.01 -0.83
***  0.84
*** 
   (0.06)  (3.07)  (2.83) 
Carhart alpha    0.14 -0.78
***  0.92
*** 
   (0.77)  (2.80)  (3.01)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Industry Returns Around Passage of Legislation, Economic Interest Signing 
    Vote Month Returns
 
 Long 
(Pass+RelSenPos) 
Month t Portfolio 
Return 
Short 
(Pass+RelSenNeg) 
Month t Portfolio  
Return 
(Long-Short) 
 Month t Portfolio 
Return 
Average returns   0.33 0.33 -0.01 
Standard deviation   4.92 4.63 3.65 
CAPM alpha    -0.14 0.10  -0.04 
   (0.61)  (0.37)  (0.13) 
Fama-French alpha    -0.26 -0.20  -0.06 
   (1.29)  (0.78)  (0.19) 
Carhart alpha    -0.16 -0.29  0.13 
   (0.78)  (1.06)  (0.43) 
Panel C: Industry Returns Around Passage of Legislation, Economic Interest Signing 
   Pre-Vote  Returns
 
 
Long 
(Pass+RelSenPos) 
Month t-6:t-1 
Portfolio Return 
Short 
(Pass+RelSenNeg) 
Month t-6:t 
Portfolio  
Return 
(Long-Short) 
Month t-6:t-1 
Portfolio Return 
Average returns   0.75 0.85 -0.10 
Standard deviation   4.00 4.21 1.82 
CAPM alpha    -0.07 0.04  -0.10 
   (0.66)  (0.27)  (0.84) 
Fama-French alpha    -0.21
**  -0.04 -0.17 
   (-2.42)  (0.28)  (1.42) 
Carhart alpha    -0.18
**  0.03 -0.22* 
   (2.06)  (0.27)  (1.74)  
 
Table IV: Cross-Sectional Regressions 
 
 
This table reports Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional predictive regressions of future value-weight industry returns 
on an economic interest signing measure and various industry-level characteristics, from 1989-2008.  The 
economic interest signing approach is described in Table III.  The dependent variable in each is future one-
month returns in month t+1 (RET).  The variable of interest in these regressions is Interested Vote.  To 
construct Interested Vote we “sign” each bill’s expected impact on a given industry by comparing the votes of 
“interested” Senators on that bill to the votes of “uninterested” Senators on that bill.  Interested Vote is the 
difference between the two (so positive when interested Senators on the given bill vote more positively than 
uninterested Senators, and negative when they vote more negatively).  We include various controls on the 
right-hand side of these regressions for industry-level momentum (i.e., the industry return from months t-12 
to t-1), one-month past industry returns, and measures of industry-level average firm size, book-to-market, 
investment (CAPEX), and ASSETS.  t-statistics are shown below the estimates, and 1%, 5%, and 10% 
statistical significance are indicated with ***,**, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Interested Vote  0.025*** 0.032*** 0.036**  0.033**  0.037** 
  (3.03) (2.85)  (2.45)  (2.47) (2.30) 
         
Industry Avg. Size   0.000  0.000  -0.001  0.000 
       (0.32)  (0.24)  (0.83)  (0.39) 
Industry Avg. Book-to-Market     -2.014  -0.839  0.298 
     (1.12)  (0.52)  (0.19) 
1-Month Lagged Ind. Returnt-1       0.033**  0.025 
       (1.98)  (1.48) 
12-Month Lagged Returnt-12:t-2       0.018***  0.015*** 
       (3.15)  (2.66) 
Industry Avg. CAPEX         0.000 
         (0.61) 
Industry Avg. ASSETS         0.000 
             (0.65) 
        
Number  of  observations  396 299 299  287 287  
 
Table V: Concentrated Senator Interests 
 
This table reports calendar-time portfolio tests as in Table III.  The Long-Short portfolio tests are computed 
exactly as in Table III except that the Economic Interest Signing measure described in Table III is refined 
here as follows.  Rather than looking at all interested Senators, we focus here only on the voting behavior of 
Senator’s whose largest industry (by market capitalization) represents an above-median (in Panel A) level of 
concentration in that state relative to all other states that have that industry during that time period. 
Concentration is measured as the share of a state’s total market cap that is made up of the industry in 
question.  Thus we “sign” each bill’s expected impact on a given industry by comparing the votes of this 
subset of “interested” Senators on that bill to the votes of all other Senators on that bill.  We then compute 
the revised Economic Interest Signing measure exactly as in Table III.  In Panel A, the concentration 
threshold we employ is above-median, and in Panel B the concentration threshold we employ is 80 percent.  
This table reports the average monthly “Long-Short” portfolio return for a portfolio that goes buys the 
“Long” portfolio and sells the “Short” portfolio each month.  The “CAPM alpha” is a risk-adjusted return 
equal to the intercept from a time-series regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on the 
value-weight market index (see Fama and French (1996).  The “Fama-French alpha” is a risk-adjusted return 
equal to the intercept from a time-series regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on the 
value-weight market index, the return on the size (SMB) factor, and the return on the value (HML) factor 
(see Fama and French (1996)).  The “Carhart alpha” is a risk-adjusted return equal to the intercept from a 
time-series regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on the value-weight market index, the 
return on the size (SMB) factor, the return on the value (HML) factor, and the return on a prior-year return 
momentum (MOM) factor (see Carhart (1997)). t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and 1%, and 5% 
statistical significance are indicated with **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic Interest Signing for Senators with Concentrated Interests 
 
 
Long    
Month t+1 Portfolio 
Return 
Short Month t+1 
Portfolio  
Return 
(Long-Short) 
Month t+1 
Portfolio 
Return 
Panel A:  Top 1 MktCap (>50% Concentrated) 
Raw returns    0.23 -0.50
  0.74
** 
   (0.50)  (1.01)  (1.97) 
CAPM alpha    -0.22 -0.96
***  0.74
** 
   (0.79)  (2.99)  (1.97) 
Fama-French alpha    -0.21 -0.88
***  0.67
* 
   (0.76)  (2.94)  (1.84) 
Carhart alpha    -0.09 -1.06
***  0.97
*** 
   (0.31)  (3.43)  (2.63) 
Panel B:  Top 1 MktCap (>80% Concentrated) 
Raw returns    0.18 -0.73
  0.92
** 
   (0.35)  (1.28)  (2.13) 
CAPM alpha    -0.11 -1.03
***  0.91
** 
   (0.38)  (2.96)  (2.12) 
Fama-French alpha    -0.10 -0.94
***  0.84
** 
   (0.32)  (2.90)  (1.99) 
Carhart alpha    0.24 -0.81
**  1.05
** 
   (0.74)  (2.28)  (2.27)  
 
Table VI: Industry Relevance and Home State Firms Only     
 
This table reports calendar-time portfolio tests as in Table III.  In Panel A we exploit variation in our 
industry assignment procedure.  Specifically, we focus solely on cases where the industry in question is the 
“most” affected of all industries in a given bill; in these cases we only use these industries to compute our 
industry-level value-weighted return.  In Panel B we refine this measure even further by only including the 
returns of those firms in a given industry who happen to be also located in one of the “interested” Senators 
home states.  This table reports the average monthly “Long-Short” portfolio return for a portfolio that goes 
buys the “Long” portfolio and sells the “Short” portfolio each month.  The “CAPM alpha” is a risk-adjusted 
return equal to the intercept from a time-series regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on 
the value-weight market index (see Fama and French (1996).  The “Fama-French alpha” is a risk-adjusted 
return equal to the intercept from a time-series regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on 
the value-weight market index, the return on the size (SMB) factor, and the return on the value (HML) factor 
(see Fama and French (1996)).  The “Carhart alpha” is a risk-adjusted return equal to the intercept from a 
time-series regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on the value-weight market index, the 
return on the size (SMB) factor, the return on the value (HML) factor, and the return on a prior-year return 
momentum (MOM) factor (see Carhart (1997)). t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and 1%, and 5% 
statistical significance are indicated with **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variation in Industry Relevance and Firms Affected
 
Long  
Month t+1 Portfolio 
Return 
Short Month t+1 
Portfolio  
Return 
(Long-Short)
Month t+1 
Portfolio Return
Panel A:  Only Focus on Industries Mentioned Most Prominently in Bill 
Raw returns  0.41  -0.60
  1.01
** 
   (0.69)  (1.08)  (2.05) 
CAPM alpha  -0.25  -1.20
***  0.95
* 
   (0.62)  (2.76)  (1.94) 
Fama-French alpha  -0.26  -1.19
***  0.92
* 
   (0.76)  (3.08)  (1.94) 
Carhart alpha  -0.09  -1.38
***  1.30
*** 
   (0.24)  (3.55)  (2.78) 
Panel B:  Only Focus on Industries Mentioned Most Prominently in Bill and Compute 
Industry Returns Only Based on Firms Located in Interested Senator’s Home State 
Raw returns  1.23  -0.56
  1.79
** 
   (1.40)  (0.58)  (1.96) 
CAPM alpha  0.19  -1.78
**  1.97
** 
   (0.25)  (2.33)  (2.11) 
Fama-French alpha  0.29  -1.71
**  2.01
** 
   (0.45)  (2.29)  (2.16) 
Carhart alpha  0.44  -1.40
*  1.84
* 
   (0.65)  (1.81)  (1.89)  
 
Table VII: Bill Complexity     
 
This table reports calendar-time portfolio tests as in Table III.  In this table we exploit variation in the 
complexity of bills.  Specifically, in Panel A we focus solely on complex bills, i.e. bills that have been voted on 
more times than the median bill (the median number of votes on a bill is 2). In Panel B we focus on non-
complex bills, i.e., the complement to the set of complex bills in Panel A. This table reports the average 
monthly “Long-Short” portfolio return for a portfolio that goes buys the “Long” portfolio and sells the 
“Short” portfolio each month.  The “CAPM alpha” is a risk-adjusted return equal to the intercept from a 
time-series regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on the value-weight market index (see 
Fama and French (1996).  The “Fama-French alpha” is a risk-adjusted return equal to the intercept from a 
time-series regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on the value-weight market index, the 
return on the size (SMB) factor, and the return on the value (HML) factor (see Fama and French (1996)).  
The “Carhart alpha” is a risk-adjusted return equal to the intercept from a time-series regression of the Long-
Short portfolio on the excess return on the value-weight market index, the return on the size (SMB) factor, 
the return on the value (HML) factor, and the return on a prior-year return momentum (MOM) factor (see 
Carhart (1997)). t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and 1%, and 5% statistical significance are indicated 
with **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variation in Bill Complexity
 
Long  
Month t+1 Portfolio 
Return 
Short Month t+1 
Portfolio  
Return 
(Long-Short)
Month t+1 
Portfolio Return
Panel A:  Complex Bills Only 
Raw returns  0.28  -0.57  0.85** 
    (0.54) (-1.07)  (2.19) 
CAPM alpha  0.18  -0.68**  0.85** 
    (0.63) (-2.17)  (2.19) 
Fama-French alpha  0.08  -0.74**  0.82** 
    (0.30) (-2.39)  (2.16) 
Carhart alpha  0.28  -0.62  0.90** 
    (1.04) (-1.96)  (2.28) 
Panel B:  Non-Complex Bills Only 
Raw returns  0.41  0.23  0.18 
    (0.90) (0.46)  (0.48) 
CAPM alpha  -0.27  -0.41  0.14 
    (-1.28) (-1.17)  (0.36) 
Fama-French alpha  -0.30  -0.51  0.21 
    (-1.49) (-1.56)  (0.55) 
Carhart alpha  -0.21  -0.60  0.39 
    (-1.01) (-1.78)  (1.00)  
 
Table VIII: Robustness Tests: Sub-periods and Economic Interest Thresholds    
 
This table reports calendar-time portfolio tests as in Table III.  In Panel A, we break the main result from 
Panel A of Table III into two sub-periods: 199001-199912, and 200001-200812.  In Panel B, we broaden the 
Economic Interest Signing measure described in Table III as follows.  Instead of using a Top 3 industry 
threshold to define whether a Senator is interested in a given bill, we employ a Top 5 and a Top 10 industry 
threshold (again where industries are ranked within each state by total aggregate firm sales).  The Long-Short 
portfolio tests are computed exactly as in Table III once this change is made to the set of interested Senators.  
This table reports the average monthly “Long-Short” portfolio return for a portfolio that goes buys the 
“Long” portfolio and sells the “Short” portfolio each month.  The “CAPM alpha” is a risk-adjusted return 
equal to the intercept from a time-series regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on the 
value-weight market index (see Fama and French (1996).  The “Fama-French alpha” is a risk-adjusted return 
equal to the intercept from a time-series regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on the 
value-weight market index, the return on the size (SMB) factor, and the return on the value (HML) factor 
(see Fama and French (1996)).  The “Carhart alpha” is a risk-adjusted return equal to the intercept from a 
time-series regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on the value-weight market index, the 
return on the size (SMB) factor, the return on the value (HML) factor, and the return on a prior-year return 
momentum (MOM) factor (see Carhart (1997)). t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and 1%, and 5% 
statistical significance are indicated with **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: Portfolio Returns Across Sub-periods
 
 
Long    
Month t+1 Portfolio 
Return 
Short Month t+1 
Portfolio  
Return 
(Long-Short) 
Month t+1 
Portfolio 
Return 
Early Sub-period: 199001-199912 
Raw returns    1.38
*** 0.73
  0.66
** 
   (2.58)  (1.30)  (2.03) 
CAPM alpha    0.01 -0.66
**  0.67
** 
   (0.03)  (2.09)  (1.99) 
Fama-French alpha    0.11 -0.50
*  0.61
* 
   (0.41)  (1.68)  (1.76) 
Carhart alpha    0.31 -0.42
  0.72
** 
   (1.10)  (1.32)  (1.96) 
Recent Sub-period: 200001-200812 
Raw returns    -0.12 -0.99
  0.86
* 
   (0.25)  (1.51)  (1.64) 
CAPM alpha    0.01 -0.88
*  0.88
* 
   (0.04)  (1.75)  (1.67) 
Fama-French alpha    -0.06 -0.86
*  0.80
* 
   (0.25)  (1.93)  (1.63) 
Carhart alpha    -0.03 -0.85
*  0.82
* 
   (0.13)  (1.91)  (1.69)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Portfolio Returns For Broader Economic Interest Classifications 
 
 
Long    
Month t+1 Portfolio Return
Short Month t+1 
Portfolio  
Return 
(Long-Short)
Month t+1 
Portfolio Return 
Top 5 Sales Industry 
Raw returns    0.76
** 0.14 0.62
** 
   (2.08)  (0.37)  (2.27) 
CAPM alpha    0.16 -0.44
* 0.60
** 
   (0.88)  (1.72)  (2.20) 
Fama-French alpha    0.09 -0.47
* 0.56
** 
   (0.52)  (1.88)  (2.06) 
Carhart alpha    0.19 -0.43
* 0.62
** 
   (1.08)  (1.65)  (2.20) 
Top 10 Sales Industry 
Raw returns    0.71
** 0.51 0.21
 
   (1.99)  (1.43)  (0.80) 
CAPM alpha    0.08 -0.09 0.17
 
   (0.47)  (0.42)  (0.69) 
Fama-French alpha    0.00 -0.17
  0.17
 
   (0.01)  (0.80)  (0.68) 
Carhart alpha    -0.04 -0.09 0.05
 
   (0.26)  (0.41)  (0.18)  
 
Table IX: Other Influences: Lobbying 
 
This table reports calendar-time portfolio tests as in Table III.  In addition to our Economic Signing Measure, 
described in Table III, we add data on lobbying expedenditures. The lobbying data we use (obtained from 
OpenSecrets.org) is available by industry and by year, since 1999.  In Panel A we replicate our main result 
from Table III over the sample period for which lobbying data is available: 199901-200812.  In Panel B we 
examine the subset of affected industries for which lobbying is most pronounced in a given year (above the 
80
th percentile of industries in terms of lobbying dollar expenditures This table reports the average monthly 
“Long-Short” portfolio return for a portfolio that goes buys the “Long” portfolio and sells the “Short” 
portfolio each month.  The “CAPM alpha” is a risk-adjusted return equal to the intercept from a time-series 
regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on the value-weight market index (see Fama and 
French (1996).  The “Fama-French alpha” is a risk-adjusted return equal to the intercept from a time-series 
regression of the Long-Short portfolio on the excess return on the value-weight market index, the return on 
the size (SMB) factor, and the return on the value (HML) factor (see Fama and French (1996)).  The 
“Carhart alpha” is a risk-adjusted return equal to the intercept from a time-series regression of the Long-
Short portfolio on the excess return on the value-weight market index, the return on the size (SMB) factor, 
the return on the value (HML) factor, and the return on a prior-year return momentum (MOM) factor (see 
Carhart (1997)). t-statistics are shown in parentheses, and 1%, and 5% statistical significance are indicated 
with **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Impact of Lobbying on Economic Interest Signing
 
 
Long    
Month t+1 Portfolio 
Return 
Short Month t+1 
Portfolio  
Return 
(Long-Short) 
Month t+1 
Portfolio 
Return 
Panel A: Economic Interest Signing over Lobbying Data Sample Period (199901-200812) 
Raw returns    0.18 -0.87
  1.05
** 
   (0.37)  (1.45)  (2.10) 
CAPM alpha    0.06 -1.00
**  1.06
** 
   (0.23)  (2.11)  (2.13) 
Fama-French alpha    -0.05 -0.95
**  0.90
* 
   (0.17)  (2.24)  (1.94) 
Carhart alpha    0.08 -0.90
**  0.98
** 
   (0.32)  (2.11)  (2.11) 
Panel B: Economic Interest Signing for High Lobbying Industries Only 
Raw returns    -0.46 -1.11
*  0.65
 
   (0.77)  (1.65)  (1.46) 
CAPM alpha    -0.45 -1.11
**  0.65
 
   (1.27)  (2.33)  (1.45) 
Fama-French alpha    -0.44 -0.89
**  0.44
 
   (1.27)  (2.32)  (1.04) 
Carhart alpha    0.04 -0.54
  0.58
 
   (0.12)  (1.36)  (1.27)  
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In this Appendix we describe in more detail the method and data cut-offs we use to: 
i.) classify bills into industries (as in Cohen and Malloy (2011)), and ii.) assign bills as 
positive or negative for the given industries to which it relates.    
  
A.1  Industry Classification, Keywords, and Cut-offs   
As described in the data section, we first download the full text of all bills jointly 
from the Government Printing Office (GPO) and Congress’s Thomas database.  We then 
parse each bill’s entire text, and use a list of matching words to classify each bill into the 
industries to which it applies.  Table A1 displays the words we use to classify into the 
Fama-French 49 industries, for three sample industries.  We are happy to provide the 
entire list upon request, for all 49 industries (but including them all in the appendix table 
made this a 13 page table).  Again, the Fama-French 49 industries are somewhat analogous 
to the SIC 2 digit industry classification, with some improvements and aggregations of 
similar SIC 2 sub-industry components.  As Table A1 shows, we obviously attempt to use a 
number of keywords to capture the bill’s relevance to a given industry.  However, we 
balance this by not choosing too many keywords to induce false positives.  In the table, we 
include when a given industry (or keyword) was removed because it was capturing too 
many false positives in the industry assignment process.   
To give a few examples, we remove the word “soda” from the “Candy and Soda” 
industry, as it kept matching with “soda ash” and “soda mountain” from a number of bills, 
both having nothing to do with the desired industry.  As another example, for the 
“Personal Services Industry,” we initially included the keyword “beauty shop.”   
Unfortunately, nearly all of the instances of this keyword in bills refer to the “House 
Beauty Shop,” referencing a (debate about) and the eventual closing of this service in one 
of the House of Representative buildings, and so we remove this keyword as well.  
Another important aspect of this table is that after deciding upon keyword roots, we 
then go through each extension and conjugation that we see in the bills in order to 
determine which extensions and conjugations reasonably refer to the given industry.  So, for 
instance, for the “Utilities” industry, we use the keyword root “utilit-.”  While this matches 
correctly “utility” and “utilities,” it incorrectly picks up “utilize” and “utilitarian,” which 
also appear in bills.  We thus remove all of the final two matches from the bill matched  
 
sample to Utilities through “utilit-.”  We do this for every keyword root in every industry 
to ensure that the given keyword root matches to the intended industry.   
  The last element of the process is then choosing threshold frequencies for each 
keyword appearing in a given bill relative to that keyword’s use across all bills, in order to 
classify a given bill as referring to that keyword’s industry.  We use two potential methods 
for this, the first is the absolute count of the keyword, and the second is the ratio of that 
word to the entire number of words in the bill.  For instance, the word “electricity” has a 
frequency cut-off of 11 times, representing the 95
th percentile of that keyword’s distribution 
amongst bills.  We have used cut-offs for both measures ranging from the 75
th-95
th 
percentile, and the results in the paper are unaffected. All results reported in the paper are 
for the middle of this range, 85
th percentile, using the absolute number of keyword 
appearances.   
The outcome of this process is a match of relevant industries to each bill considered 
in congress.  We believe we have a quite conservative match process, but match fairly 
definitively 20% of all bills to a relevant industry (or industries).   
 
A.2  Bill Signing Procedure 
  In order to “sign” each bill as either positive or negative for the assigned industries, 
we examine the voting record of the Senators who have an interest in each of our assigned 
industries.  We establish this by summing up the constituent firms located in each 
Senator’s state (we have used sales, market equity, number of employees, and number of 
firms, and they are highly correlated and yield nearly identical results in terms of 
magnitude and significance).  Then, for each state, we rank all industries that reside in that 
state and define “important” industries for that state as those that rank in the top 3 for 
that year.  We assign these for each state in each congress, so again displaying the entire 
table would be quite large.  However, in Table A2 we include a subset of state-industry and 
congress classifications (again, we are happy to provide the entire table upon request, but 
including them all made this table over 17 pages).  To give an example from the Table A2, 
in the state of New York during the 110
th Congress (2007-2008), the most important 
industries in the state were Banks, Insurance, and Sales & Trading.     
 
  Once the important industries for each state are established, we then map these to 
the voting records of the Senators in each state.  We then classify each bill that mentions 
the given industry as positive or negative for the mentioned industry using the interested 
Senators’ votes. For instance, consider bill S.3044 form the 110
th Congress shown in Figures 
A1 and A2.  Figure A1 indicates that this particular bill that was assigned only to the 
Fama-French industry #30: Petroleum and Natural Gas, based on the relative frequency of 
pre-specified keywords in the bill that pertain to this industry.  Figure A1 displays the 
summary text at the top of the bill, which indicates that the bill clearly pertains to the oil 
and gas industry.  Figure A2 then displays the executable program we created to 
implement our signing procedure for the same bill depicted in Figure A1.  The summary 
text indicates that the goal of this bill was "to provide energy price relief and hold oil 
companies and other entities accountable for their actions with regard to high energy 
prices, and for other purposes," so the bill was likely to be perceived as negative for the oil 
and gas industry.  The Petroleum and Natural Gas Industry qualified as an important 
industry in 8 states (including TX and LA), so the total number of “interested” votes in 
the bill was 16.  Not surprisingly, even though this vote lined up largely along party lines, 
none of the 6 Republican Senators who voted in favor of the bill were Senators who were 
"tied" to this industry via constituent interests in their home state (all 8 industry-tied 
Republicans voted against), and 1 of the 2 Democrats who voted against the bill was Mary 
Landrieu of Louisiana, a state heavily represented by oil and gas interests (the other 
Democrat who voted against was Henry Reid from Nevada, a consistent supporter of oil 
and gas companies); the 6 industry-tied Democrats who voted in favor of the bill did so 
largely on party and ideological grounds (variables that we control for in our tests).   
Specifically, we “sign” each bill’s expected impact on a given industry by comparing 
the votes of “interested” Senators on that bill to the votes of “uninterested” Senators on 
that bill.  Again, interested Senators on a given bill are those where an industry affected by 
the bill is a “Top 3” industry in that Senator’s home state (where industries are ranked 
within each state by total aggregate firm sales, or total market capitalization).  We then 
compute an Economic Interest Signing measure as follows: we compute the ratio of positive 
votes of all interested Senators by dividing their total number of yes votes on a bill by their 
total number of votes, and compare this to the ratio of positive votes of all uninterested  
 
Senators; if the ratio of positive votes by interested Senators is greater than that for 
uninterested Senators, we call this a “positive” bill for the industry in question, and if the 
ratio of positive votes for interested Senators is less than that for uninterested Senators, we 
call this a “negative” bill for the industry.  Our results are very similar regardless of 
whether we use this ratio difference (“R-R” in Figure A2) measure, or alternative signing 
measures such as the absolute ratio ("Ratio" in Figure A2, i.e., the percentage of industry-
tied Senators who vote for the bill), or the relative ratio ("R/R" in Figure A2, i.e., the 
percentage of industry-tied Senators who vote for the bill divided by the percentage of all 
Senators who vote for the bill). and the ratio difference ("R-R" in Figure A2, i.e., the 
percentage of industry-tied Senators who vote for the bill minus the percentage of all 
Senators who vote for the bill); our results are not sensitive to the particular signing 
measure we employ.  We have also tried within-party signing measures that are computed 
identically to those above, except aggregated within each party (since many votes are along 
party lines) and again the results are very similar. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table A1: Industry Assignment Keywords and Cut-offs 
 
This table shows the keywords used in assigning the full text of each bill in our sample to the resultant 
industries covered by the bill, along with the cut-offs for the percentile in the distribution of that keyword for 
the entire sample.  We assign the given industry to a bill if any one of its keywords is above the 85
th 
percentile cut-off given in the table.  We choose a subset of the 49 industries (Fama-French Industry 
Classification) that we use, as the table would otherwise be prohibitively long.  We are happy to provide the 
entire table of keywords and cut-offs upon request.  
 
Fama-French 
Industry # / 
Industry Name 
Keyword 
Count 
Greater Than / Equal 
To 
Count 
Percentile 
    
 agricultur-  12 85
 animal  feed  7 85
 corn  4 85
1 — Agriculture  crop(s) 14 85
 farm(s)(land)  11 85
 fishing  8 85
 livestock  7 85
 wheat 8 85
    
    
 air  force  31 85
 Ammunition  15 85
 armed  force(s)  10 85
 army  13 85
 gun(s)(runners)(powder) 8 85
26 — Defense marine  corps  30 85
 military  11 85
 missile(s)  23 85
 national  guard  30 85
 navy  19 85
 ordnance  7 85
 space  vehicle(s)  3 85
 tanks  9 85
 weapon(s)  15 85
    
     
 broker  dealer(s)  3 85
 closed  end  2 85
 commodity  broker(s) 14 85
  financial services firm(s) 2 85
 investment  bank(s)  8 85
 investment  firm(s)  2 85
48 — Trading investment  management 6 85
 investment  trust(s)  12 85
 mutual  fund(s)  3 85
 reit(s)  44 85
  broker-dealer(s)  No Keyword Count Information Available
  closed-end  No Keyword Count Information Available
 security  broker(s) Keyword  removed : Only 2 bills with the 
keyword, and all appear in definition clauses 
  unit trust(s)  No Keyword Count Information Available
  
 
 
Table A2: Industry Assignments by State 
 
This table shows the 3 most important industries for each state at the beginning, midpoint, and endpoint of 
our sample.  “Importance” is measured by summing up the market equity of all publicly traded firms in each 
industry residing in a state, and then ranking industries.  We thus show below the three largest industries 
operating in each given state over each Congress.  We choose a subset of states and Congresses, as the table 
would otherwise be prohibitively long.  We are happy to provide the entire table of states, industries 
operating in those states, and most important industries for each state and Congress upon request.  
 
 
State  Fama-French 
Industry #  Industry Name  Congress 
TX 30 Oil 101
TX 31 Utilities 101
TX 32 Telecom 101
TX 30 Oil 105
TX 32 Telecom 105
TX 35 Computers 105
TX 30 Oil 110
TX 31 Utilities 110
TX 32 Telecom 110
 
NY 45 Banks 101
NY 46 Insurance 101
NY 48 Trading 101
NY 45 Banks 105
NY 46 Insurance 105
NY 48 Trading 105
NY 45 Banks 110
NY 46 Insurance 110
NY 48 Trading 110
 
CA 32 Telecom 101
CA 35 Computers 101
CA 43 Retail 101
CA 35 Computers 105
CA 36 Software 105
CA 37 Electronic  Equipment 105
CA 35 Computers 110
CA 36 Software 110
CA 37 Electronic  Equipment 110
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 